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Freaks and not freaks: 
Theatre and the making 
of crip identity
ON SOME LEVEL it seems obvious that some disabled actors will 
want to explore the history of freak show performances. To replicate 
a performance form that neither performer nor audience have expe-
rienced has the frisson of an historical re-enactment. Somewhere, 
people who looked like you were stared at as freaks by the audience. 
What would that have been like? For the freaks? For the spectator? 
!is essay is an attempt to engage with the multiple possibilities of 
engagement and identity that are bound up in the idea of the freak 
shows, acting and spectatorship. 
From their very earliest days, Graeae !eatre Company, a UK 
company artistically led by disabled people, have explored and used 
freak show images: their "rst piece, Sideshow, played wittily and 
angrily with the ways in which disabled people are enfreaked in 
their everyday lives. A more recent piece by Graeae, !e last freak 
show engages with disability as a performance tradition. Disability 
theatre has developed a relationship with the freak show, and this 
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has been explored in many performances in the UK and the USA. 
!e freak show has also been used theatrically outside the boun-
daries of disability theatre, and I will be looking brie#y at Tennes-
see Williams’ atmospheric freak show play !e mutilated to explore 
the possibilities of the connections between theatre, stigma and the 
proto-crip identity.
!e freak show is cited and quoted in the work of disabled per-
formers, and in this essay I start to consider the uses of the cultural 
trope of the freak show in disability theatre. I want to consider the 
ways in which disability and freaks mutually alter each other. I con-
sider some of the implications of the notion of the freak show for a 
performative elaboration of disabled bodies. I also speculate about 
the possibility that disability theatre formalises the relationship bet-
ween performer and spectator, overwriting more di$cult, proble-
matic, contingent relationships in favour of a performative construc-
tion of the disabled person and the disabling society.
!e constraints of space here prevent me from synthesising 
anything of the superb range of histories and cultural criticism of 
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century freak show or circus 
side-show. Freak show scholarship may be said to overshadow the 
work that I analyse here without having a physical presence in this 
piece of writing, and this starts to communicate the very point of my 
argument. Freak show scholarship has in many diverse ways infused 
important debates in feminist theory, theatre and performance stu-
dies, literary criticism and "lm studies. In keeping with the breadth 
and diversity of the debates that span multiple disciplines, I have 
chosen to introduce critical utterances that at various stages proble-
matise my approach to theatre and the "gure of the freak.
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What is a freak show? 
In the subtitle of his book Freak Show, Robert Bogdan refers to a 
tradition of ”presenting human oddities for amusement and pro"t” 
(1988). !e freak show o%ers the discourse of the museum, with 
its attendant colonialism and scientism, the phoney claim that the 
display of human diversity may contribute to knowledge. !is is 
placed alongside the tawdry glitter of the capitalist industrial enter-
tainment that was the travelling circus sideshow: the possibilities 
of making big pro"ts by earning small change from the curiosity of 
the masses.
Tod Browning’s "lm Freaks is a familiar and accessible text about 
the freak show. Freaks tries to capture sideshow performances as 
ordinary actions within the diegesis of the movie. !e act of drin-
king wine with your foot, or rolling and lighting a cigarette with 
only your mouth were central to the sideshow acts of the performers. 
Within the narrative of the "lm, these acts are presented as inci-
dental and mundane, but within the freak show and also within the 
"lm itself they would have been the point of the whole performance. 
!is is a key element of the freak show: the boundary between 
being and performing is eroded. !e anomalous body provides the 
occasion for the performance. In a discussion of the monstrous and 
the freak show, Margrit Shildrick emphasises the point of the dis-
tinction between the banal content of the action of a freak show and 
the way that it was framed to render it novel:
!e point is that freak shows were productions which staged not 
’real life’ as such, but more or less meticulously contrived spectacles, 
which encouraged viewers to think and see in terms of various 
binary distinctions between ”them” and ”us” (Shildrick 2002:24).
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For Shildrick, the signi"cant act or action takes place at the level 
of the spectator. !e meticulously contrived spectacle sets up a dy-
namic, disturbing (and pleasurable) set of connections and specula-
tions between the categories that already exist as part of the mecha-
nics of viewing, thinking and perceiving di%erence.
The last freakshow
Let me "rst examine an example of the citing or quoting of the 
popular performance tradition. In !e last freakshow (Kenny 2002), 
the performers in a "nancially troubled circus side-show meet to 
celebrate the year 2000 with their "nal performance. !e charac-
ters are played by disabled actors, each of whom have twisted their 
own speci"c impairments into some sort of freak show attraction. 
!e ringmaster, Gustav Drool, mediates between performers and 
between performers and audience and o%ers the main point of 
movement and focus as he interprets, frames and explains. As he 
introduces the freaks, he addresses the audience directly, claiming 
a kinship with impaired people in history. He also claims to be 
a messenger, speaking for disabled people of the past in the "rst 
person singular:
GUSTAV: To cut a long story short, and not wanting to rub your 
noses in it – I’ve been enslaved, incarcerated, mocked and ignored. 
I’ve been experimented on, sterilised and gassed and I’m cur-
rently gazing through the bars at the paint cracking on orphanage 
walls from Bow to Beijing. I guess you could say I was pissed o% 
. . . and I still haven’t got to give me message. (Pause) Well this 
is your last chance. !is is the message. But it’s in code (Kenny 
2002:229).
Garry Robson as Gustav Drool in !e last freak show. 
(Photo: Joel Fildes)
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Gustav is a messenger for culture and a representative of history. 
Questions about autobiography and personal narrative "ll the space 
that seems to have been created for spectacle. Photographs of real 
historical freak show performers are projected and discussed by 
the characters as if they were family members. History is trun-
cated. !e history of the diegetic performers and the past freak 
show performers is the same. !e di%erence is that the form of the 
freak show is dying. !e popularity, the celebrity of the past freaks 
is contrasted with the "nancial failure of the present day freaks. 
!e performers in the last freak show look back: what has gone 
wrong, and why is the freak show dying? In performance, as the 
cast gather round projected images for their family history session, 
the black and white images of the real past freaks produce a fris-
son of excitement in the audience. !e bodies of the live actors are 
disabled people, and they are trying to perform freakishness. But 
they are not freaks. Fictional anecdotes connect the past freaks 
(the real freaks) with the disabled actors. But in the diegetic world 
it isn’t enough to make the performance form viable or popular. In 
this "ction, the freak show is always at the point of receding into 
the past.
Christian the wobbling boy is accompanied by a mirror alter-ego, 
referred to throughout as his brother, Gilbert. Gilbert, we learn, 
walks and talks, and, unlike Christian, doesn’t wobble. Gilbert is 
in the Army, whereas Christian is a freak show performer. !e part 
was created by the actor Jamie Beddard, whose movement is af-
fected by cerebral palsy. In photographic images, his impairment is 
not at all apparent. !e ”twins” conceit makes theatrical the nature 
of Beddard’s impairment and creates a binary between two ways of 
reading Christian – as movement or as image.
One of the most important in#uences on Graeae’s work through-
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out its thirty-year history is the social model of disability. !is con-
siders disability as a form of inequality that is created and maintai-
ned by society and culture. Its aim is to eradicate the attitudinal and 
physical barriers that stand in the way of disabled people and their 
full participation in society. Disability criticism considers the vari-
ous ways in which notions of disability in art and culture are used 
and abused to maintain the power di%erences between disabled and 
non-disabled people. To associate disability with the monstrous, the 
evil or the unusually saintly is to prevent others from responding 
straightforwardly to the individual. !e use of disability as me-
taphor is one example of the preoccupations of disability criticism. 
Here, in a private moment that is not addressed to the audience, 
Christian talks to his mirror-twin about therapy, and about the rea-
lity that might lie beneath the freak show image: 
CHRISTIAN (talks to mirror image): Gilbert [...]
I’ve been doing therapy lately
I’ve done all sorts.
I’ve located my inner child
But it won’t speak to me.
I mean. Nobody’s right are they?
Lately, I’ve been locating my inner cripple.
I haven’t told Avia because she’ll think its metaphorical.
It isn’t.
My therapist says, you’ve got to look past the outer casing to see 
the real person.
!e therapist helps "nd the true you.
I mean you might be a paraplegic, but the inner you, might be 
totally paralysed (Kenny 2002:241).
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Christian o%ers a chance to reject the reading of disability as me-
taphor, and also to upset the assumption that the freak show image 
is either straightforwardly false or straightforwardly truthful. !e 
wobbling boy may be created to dupe the spectator, to frame the ac-
tor as freak and to perform simply being. However, the gap between 
the character and his mirror image provides the specular distance 
that allows the character to analyse himself, to see himself as other 
than he seems to others, or to himself. !is brief solo conversation 
opens up some of the possibilities that the one-way conversations 
between disabled people and freaks may reveal. 
Theatre Studies and Spectatorship
If theatre studies really has a disciplinary perspective, then it is 
grounded in the exercise of critical extrapolation and model making. 
!ere is a perpetual uncertainty about the object of investigation, 
and the act of positioning the speaker and directing the critical act 
is a gargantuan e%ort that often exceeds the potential of the argu-
ment.
Questions of intention and reception, meaning and interpretation, 
are opened to critical scrutiny from every perspective. !e act of 
creating a performance involves, of course, a process of scrutinising 
human behaviour, an aesthetic and analytical model for rendering 
such behaviour into art, and a profound empathy and speculation 
about the ways in which an audience might respond to that which 
is shown onstage. At the centre of the discipline, in all its concerns 
with reception, is the profoundly humanist and liberal supposition 
that you will respond as I respond: as a director, what I create on-
stage must please you if it pleases me, must communicate to you if it 
is legible to me. You and I are more or less the same, at least to the 
point where we can converse and share ideas through theatre. 
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!e conventions of behaviour and representation, and the aesthe-
tic or stylistic elements that frame and contain these conventions, 
might be those we could call universal or truthful, if we could ima-
gine forgetting all the works of post-structural theory we have ever 
read. But, as Susan Sontag warned, ”None of us can ever retrieve 
that innocence before all theory”. (Sontag 2009:4) Surrounding the 
centre of this humanist disciplinary perspective are the layers of 
attempts – full libraries of these – to employ critical and cultural 
theories to blast away at the foundations of this empathetic nucleus.
In her book Staring: how we look, disability studies scholar Rose-
marie Garland-!omson, places discursive brackets around an ele-
ment of her book. !e humanist empathy that I need to make or to 
write about theatre, Garland-!omson uses in order to write about 
the human response to anomalous bodies. Quite reasonably, since 
she has no wish to expend either the limited word budget or the 
argumentative force of her work on material that is not her focus, 
she explains that she has adopted, for the sake of the #uency and 
structure of her argument, the ”invitational we” (Garland-!omson 
2009:10). !is theatrical positioning is at the centre of the humanist 
engagement. It is the mode of investigation and also the object of 
inquiry.
Garland-!omson invokes Erving Go%man who, throughout 
Stigma: !e management of a spoiled identity, addresses the reader in 
terms that oblige us to share a critical and experiential perspective. 
Go%man’s work is one of the common foundations of both disability 
and performance studies. !roughout Stigma Go%man addresses 
the reader as ”we normals” and he collects together those with:
Abominations of the body – the various physical deformities. Next 
there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, 
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domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, 
and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for 
example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, ho-
mosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political 
behaviour (Go%man1990:14).
Go%man’s Stigma was published in 1963, a mere two years before 
Tennessee Williams’ play. !e construction of a dramatic framework 
for the perception of stigma is the principal form of !e mutilated. 
For Williams, the diegetic world o%ers no escape, but the uneasy al-
liances between alcoholics, thieves, prostitutes and disabled people 
create a powerful, compelling and disturbing world.
!e repetition of the "rst person plural, the phrase ”we normals” 
in Go%man’s book feels increasingly satirical as the book proceeds 
and we recognise the tenuous nature of a coherent and normal iden-
tity. In order to engage with the argument, we must put up with the 
positioning in which we are all together, all unanimously engaged 
in the stigmatising of human oddities. 
For the sake of the argument we must submit to this positio-
ning. Both Go%man and Garland-!omson seek to invoke a ten-
sion between the average and the knowing onlooker. If Garland-
!omson says that ”we” stare, for example, at a person with facial 
dis"gurement, or if Go%man says that ”we” regard people with 
non-mainstream political views as stigmatised, what they are each 
creating is an audience to substantiate their social critique. !ere 
is a form of interpellation in which ”we” confess to a perspective 
in order to critique and indeed challenge it. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this perspective is a form of empathetic social role-play, 




It is a boring truism that theatre needs an audience in order to be 
theatre. Is it the case that the appropriation of tropes of freak show 
performance needs an audience to respond spontaneously in a live 
moment? Or does the live audience merely stand in for the ”invi-
tational we”, a collective that exists only for the sake of a theatrical 
argument about di%erence and inequality? Some feminist writing of 
the 1980s is lampooned for the habit of stating ”As a feminist…” or 
”As a woman and a mother and a circus performer, I …”, implying 
that the identi"cation of an identity position o%ers an explanation 
for and ownership of the analytical position that she articulates. !e 
invitational ”we” runs counter to the impulse of queer theory and its 
close relation, Crip !eory. We are disabled people who imagine 
that under some circumstances we are ”they” to others.
In his book, Staging stigma: a critical examination of the American 
freak show, Michael M. Chemers claims that ”[Garland-]!omson’s 
rigorous humanistic investigation has incited a new category of 
scholarship, a growing lineage of serious writings that investigate 
freakery not solely as the victimisation of a disenfranchised mino-
rity but rather as a highly specialised and potentially liberating form 
of performance art.” He goes on to claim that, ”Although not every 
disabled body in performance is freakery, every disabled body in 
performance (on stage or in everyday interaction) enters into some 
kind of dialogue with the perceived history of the freak show” (Che-
mers 2008:25). !ese are powerful claims, and I am entirely happy 
to concede the importance of freak shows to disability culture, but 
with one proviso: that we look carefully at the audience, as well as 
at the freak, that we engage carefully in the interpellative acts that 
occur in the act of making theatre. 
Disability seeks to reorder, but it is profoundly against disorder. 
At some level, disability is always administrative. Disorder is the 
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province of freaks, the uncanny and the abjected. Freaks are thea-
trical and powerful, and are always collected into some sort of en-
semble in the contemporary imagination of them. Disabled people 
are ordinary, and that is the point of social model perspectives. !e 
disabled person who is interested in freaks – or interested in being a 
freak – has become fascinated with the power of their own presence 
in the visual "eld. But ”freak” is not straightforwardly a political 
identity. Freaks may be the distorted shadows of the e%ects of the 
stare, but they are not a solution or a negotiation of a new form of 
political existence. Instead, they o%er a chance to disturb the cate-
gories that disable, and to disturb disability itself.
!e imagined past popularity of the circus side show or freak show 
contrasts strikingly with the lack of popularity of disability theatre 
which is, by its nature, small-scale and fairly low budget. One of 
the subjects of the freak show play is the invocation of past popu-
lar audiences. !e play addresses past prurience and past prejudices 
which, through the act of repeating and performing, arcs over into 
the audience of today. ”We”, the audience, are addressed as punters. 
We are invited to stare, we are told about our responses to these 
visibly anomalous bodies. Often it is a bad "t. In a piece of disability 
theatre what must the disabled spectator do in order to think of the 
familiar bodies on the stage as somehow freakish and disturbing? If 
one is a disabled person, it may be unusual but wonderful to gaze 
at a person with a similar impairment to one’s own. Faced with the 
elusive mirror for one’s own body, the disabled spectator may well 
simultaneously read and re-read their own positioning in term of 
novelty and familiarity, identity, similitude and di%erence.
To invoke the idea of freaks is to choose a past and to create a 
speci"c moment of genesis for the noticing of spectator positions. 
!e freak show o%ers a cipher for the mediation between audience 
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and performer. !e use of the freak show persuades the audience to 
look at impaired bodies with interest, with desire mixed with horror, 
and with boredom mixed with disgust. Even if the audience resists 
this persuasion, the performance ignores this and addresses them 
into the position of freak show audience. !e invocation of the ”we” 
in both Go%man and Garland-!omson is an attempt to draw us in, 
to draw us towards that which is both unusual, freakish, monstrous, 
and also part of us. 
Freaks and not freaks
In an extended discussion of the political possibilities of the notion 
of the freak show, Feminist scholar Elizabeth Grosz explains what 
she means when she talks about freaks. She uses the term, she says, 
as a political gesture, as something ”roughly equivalent to ’queer’”; a 
term which might function as an act of de"ance, a ”political ges-
ture of self-determination” (Grosz 1996:56). She then goes on to 
describe the people she wishes to include, and those she wishes to 
positively exclude from her analysis. She does this in the following 
passage. I quote at length here because it enumerates the negative 
examples, and its e%ect is cumulative:
First, let me clarify what I do not mean by the term: I wish to ex-
clude from my discussion the more commonplace bodily in"rmities 
and de"ciencies – those born with non-functional or improperly 
functional limbs and organs, the blind, those who are unable to 
walk, and those with cerebral palsy and other medical disor-
ders. While these persons may be as or more disabled than those 
categorised as freaks, they do not exert the same ambivalent appeal. 
[...]. !e term freaks does not simply refer to disabilities of either a 
genetic, developmental, or contingent kind. Indeed some classi"ed 
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as freaks (such as the bearded lady or the human skeleton) are not 
necessarily physically incapacitated at all, although, of course, many 
are. [...] 
!e freak is thus neither unusually gifted nor unusually disadvan-
taged. He or she is not an object of simple admiration or pity, but is 
a being who is considered simultaneously and compulsively fascina-
ting and repulsive, enticing and sickening (Grosz 1996:56).
Grosz expresses a wish to exclude the more commonplace bodily 
in"rmities and de"ciencies. !is seems perfectly straightforward. If 
we are used to seeing a particular bodily form, then the impulse to 
simultaneously stare and look away is reduced. You cannot have a 
commonplace freak. With reduction in novelty value, the freak ma-
kes the transition from freak to not-freak and into the commonplace 
category of disability.
Grosz’s careful selection is an attempt to use language to arti-
culate the operation of other linguistic categories. Her goal is the 
increased disturbance and the creation of a radical indeterminacy of 
identity categories, for which she requires tight categories of iden-
tity. !e operation of freakish bodies relies on the careful exclusion 
of disability and impairment because Grosz seeks to read freakish 
bodies in the light of other theoretical and political paradigms. !e 
creation of a category that includes both conjoined twins and people 
with cerebral palsy upsets the disturbance of categories because the 
radical potential of these bodies cannot be focussed so precisely and 
e%ectively on the boundaries of other categories if it seems that an-
other set of boundary laws operate upon them. In other words, iden-
tity politics can’t be used to dismantle identity. Unless, of course, 
one "nds a series of free #oating bodies to signify without signi"ca-
tion, to be the conduit for the analysis of the categories of sex and 
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gender, and the discovery of the failure of these categories. In this 
way Grosz establishes the freak as both a theatrical and a political 
"gure. !e disabled person is not and cannot be read in this way 
without shifting the spectatorial frame.
Wherever we believe that di%erence is caused, we resist the urge 
to indulge in the fascination and repugnance that is enjoyed when 
apprehending a freak. Freaks are stripped of their medical narrati-
ves. To Grosz, disabled people cannot be freaks. !ey are protected 
by legislation, studied by science and social science, medicine and 
disability studies. !e scientists have tamed the freaks and created 
disabled people. Freaks, on the other hand, are a way of stepping 
back to a less enlightened time where our fear of the di%erent and 
the ugly, the uncanny, the abject can have profound e%ects that sus-
tain the boundaries of our own identities. !e freak show holds a 
purpose in our comprehension of a terrible past in which pennies 
were paid at bedlam and Leo the dog-faced boy earned his living 
simply by being the body he was, and being present within the per-
formance frame of the freak show. Disabled people are not freaks 
unless they fascinate and appal us simultaneously. Grosz is interested 
in the junction between freak and normal. For Go%man, normality 
is "rst person plural, ”we normals”. For Grosz, the normal is the 
second person, ”you”. In both cases the freak is a third person term. 
The mutilated
If we perceive freakishness as a way of framing and interpreting 
certain bodies, then we need to consider that freaks are not neces-
sarily the interpretative property of disabled critics and performers. 
In search of an example of freak images that are cut loose from 
disability, I would like to look brie#y at one American play of the 
1960s. Tennessee Williams’ work o%ers several signi"cant examples 
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for the use of impairment, and if I were o%ering a comprehensive 
survey of ”images of disability”, his work would deserve a separate 
chapter. From mental distress in A streetcar named Desire or !e night 
of the iguana to intellectual impairment in Suddenly last summer th-
rough the clash between physical frailty and strength in Kingdom of 
earth, deafness in A lovely sunday for Creve Coeur or physical impair-
ment in !e glass menagerie, Williams demonstrates a consistent in-
terest in and use of impairment on stage. !e reason for mentioning 
him here, however, is because one of his late one-act plays evokes 
a nightmarish world of loss, pain and exile through the citation of 
freak show images, and this seems to o%er a useful example to try 
analyses of the uses of freak shows outside the frame of disability. 
An ensemble Christmas carol brings the audience into a non-rea-
listic nightmare world of entrapment and exclusion:
I think the strange, the crazed, the queer
Will have their holiday this year
And for a while, A little while
!ere will be pity for the wild (Williams 2000:585). 
!e mutilated is an expressionistic leap into the world of Trinket Du-
gan, a wealthy woman who has been traumatised and ostracised 
through the removal of a breast. !e illness that presumably led to 
this trauma is left unexplored, although Williams allows it to enter 
the play – literally – as a character who represents fate. !e employ-
ment of his freak show images and the creation of the world of the 
exiles have such an excess of signi"cation that the psychoanalytic ma-
terial explored above seems to infuse every element of the play. At the 
same time, the play is undoubtedly of a kind with the pieces of work 
that Susan Sontag attacked in her polemic Illness as metaphor (1978). 
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Sontag argued strongly that it is morally impermissible to use can-
cer as metaphor, and Williams is doing precisely this in treating 
Trinket’s recovering body as somehow scandalous. !ere is an evo-
cation of cultural prejudices about bodies and behaviours that are 
invoked to develop a ”non-realistic” world in which the stage world 
stands for a rejected category of living. Trinket’s cancer and surgery 
stands as biological metaphor for the rejection of other forms of li-
ving. Williams also evokes the world of stigmatised living as a way 
of wallowing in the landscape of rejection and stigma.
!e play never speci"cally addresses the idea that Trinket has 
recovered from cancer. !e attempts to be non-speci"c are attempts 
to avoid direct address, to evoke a broad and dislocated world of 
isolation rather than the speci"c circumstances of a person who has 
experienced a speci"c disease. !e play is composed of the sorts of 
metaphorical trappings that Sontag discusses when she explains that 
”the metaphorical trappings that deform the experience of having 
cancer have very real consequences [...] the metaphors and myths 
kill” (Sontag 2002:99). Celine, the alcoholic shoplifting prostitute 
(a description that emerges very clearly from Go%man), discovers 
that Trinket has been ”mutilated” and, when Trinket refuses to be 
blackmailed, sings this song loudly as a threat of disclosure:
Sa-rah Bern-hardt had one leg.
!e oth-er was a wood-en peg.
But good she did, yep, she did good,
Clump-ing on a STUMP OF WOOD! (Williams 2000:611) 
!ere is a feathered bird-girl too, a constructed freak show perfor-
mer, who passes through the play without speaking. !e song and 
the bird-girl add a backdrop of freak show performance. References 
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to freakishness and weirdness occur very regularly throughout the 
dialogue. !e citation of a real-life performing amputee – Bern-
hardt in her later years – folds in a freak show reference in which, 
according to urban legend, the freak show proprietor P.T. Barnum is 
rumoured to have tried to buy Bernhardt’s amputated leg from her. 
!e feathered ”freak” and the woman recovering from a mastec-
tomy are placed together on stage. All the roles involve the visual 
disturbance of the fabric of the ordinary or the realistic world. If 
we borrow Williams’ word for this "ctional world, we could say 
this: even when they are trying to be passed o% as real, freaks are 
nonrealistic. !ey form an ensemble of characters, trapped by their 
di%erences in the non-realistic world of the ”strange, the crazed, the 
queer”, and o%er a shift in the shape of the world. Sontag’s anger 
at the injurious e%ects of the metaphorical use of cancer might be 
remembered at this point: real bodies meet "ction, but in many dif-
ferent ways.
Administrative Disability
At this point I need to look outside theatre for an example that helps 
me to focus on the articulation and control of spectatorial positio-
ning. I have found one example that seemed at "rst not to rely on 
an assumption or performance of the audience’s non-disabled iden-
tity. !e Paralympics is the most famous international gathering of 
disabled athletes, and it draws audiences of millions for its interna-
tional broadcasts. !e ways in which disabled bodies are looked at is 
quite precisely organised. !e event o%ers an ordered contemplation 
of types of corporeal divergence from the usual human body. !is is 
a short quote from the Olympics website in which you will start to 
notice the Paralympics’ way of distinguishing between classes of 
athlete for track and "eld events: 
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Athletes are classi"ed in various classes, based on their type of 
disability:
Athletes with cerebral palsy are classi"ed in classes 32 to 38. In 
classes 32 to 34, athletes compete in a wheelchair, and in classes 35 
to 38 in an upright standing position.
Athletes with spinal cord injuries or other physical disabilities, 
other than cerebral palsy, are classi"ed according to their mobility 
pro"le, in classes 51 to 54 for track events and 51 to 58 for throw-
ing events. In these classes athletes compete in a wheelchair…. 1 
!e ethos of the Paralympics o%ers an administrative model of disa-
bility – not precisely medical, it develops an articulation of ability 
and similitude that translates into a spectacle of sporting fairness. It 
holds something in common with the administrative designation of 
disability for the purposes of support, assistance and social bene"ts. 
!e lists of functional abilities and disabilities somehow produce a 
formula to determine how much social support the individual disab-
led person is entitled to receive. Both involve an interpretation of 
bodies according to a schema of ability and normalcy. 
Both of these models run sharply counter to the social model 
perspectives of disability politics and disability studies. In the so-
cial model, disability is the condition of being disabled by a non-
disabled society. However, disability is also a self-chosen identity; 
it is one which can be celebrated. Disability culture and politics are 
at the forefront of attempts to challenge and question the assumed 
ubiquity of human autonomy, symmetry and anatomical normalcy. 
!e real-terms common ground between the older person with 
hearing loss, the young para-athlete with lower-limb prosthetics 
and the middle-aged person with a learning disability is not at all 
easy to imagine. For this to work, we need to generate a coalition 
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that is also a utopia. !is is not possible within the prescriptive 
spectatorial framework of the Paralympics, or any administrative 
model of disability. !e spectator is always supplied with biograp-
hical detail of the Paralympic athlete and the conceptual frame for 
watching the competition. Competitive achievement is subordinate 
to an overwhelming narrative of triumph over adversity. Recent 
billboard adverts in the UK for the 2012 Paralympic games involve 
images of athletes with captions, all of which refer to a dynamic of 
overcoming adversity:
Don’t look at the legs, look at the records.
You can see it’s a perfect throw. She doesn’t need to.
Making a horse dance isn’t easy. Without legs it’s almost impossible.
400 metres in 46 seconds. Just with his arms.
He doesn’t need feet. !ey’d only slow him down.2 
Crip culture o%ers a chance to reverse the somewhat oppressive pre-
valence of assumed non-disabled normality. Rather than trying to 
integrate disabled people into a disabling world, there is an attempt 
to re-imagine the world as a di%use, connected place that is made 
for real bodies and the real abilities and interests of its inhabitants. 
Rather than tightly control the spectatorial framework with ready-
made interpretations, and so entirely unlike Paralympic cultures, 
Crip !eory seeks to challenge the fundamental fabric of society 
through the creation of a political and cultural utopia. !e strate-
gic similarities between queer and crip politics has been noted by a 
number of commentators, and especially by Robert McRuer, whose 
book Crip !eory: cultural signs of queerness and disability (2006) ex-
plores the common ground of these political movements.
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When is a freak not a freak?
If a freak is regarded as a disabled person, s/he is removed from the 
uncertainty and prurience of complex spectator habits. Disability 
is an interpellation of both spectator and the non-spectacular body. 
When is a freak not a freak? When we respond to them in a simple 
way. When we read one meaning, disability, and not many mea-
nings. When the body loses its ability to transform or disturb or ap-
pal, it is not a freak body. When the signi"er is tied to the signi"ed 
(as if that were ever possible) there is no freakishness. An example of 
this would be: tragic car accident/wheelchair user or amputee /brave 
soldier. When our response to the body is to see beyond it or despite 
it, when we desire to treat or to palliate, or to "t it into a simple nar-
rative of tragedy or triumph over adversity, then we are not looking 
at a freak. Impairment is the freakish bad conscience of disability 
within the context of any model. 
!e wish to disembody the freak from the commonplace disabled 
person seems initially trivial, but is exceedingly important. Grosz 
is looking for the possibility of using freakish bodies in a way that 
doesn’t maintain the distinction between body and person. Unlike 
Go%man, Grosz doesn’t attempt to imagine the attempts at integra-
tion or the denial of human rights. Like Go%man she assumes that 
we readers are not nor could ever be freaks, that we experience the 
vicarious pleasures of voyeurism when we see a freak. Or, rather, to 
borrow a move from the Social Model, it is our vicarious pleasure 
that constitutes freaks. But she has used freakish bodies to advance 
generalised theses about bodies in general. 
I’d like to step away from freaks for a couple of paragraphs in 
order to explore another example that may be helpful in articulating 
my conclusion. In Gender trouble, Judith Butler analyses Foucault’s 
account of the story of Herculine Barbin, an intersexed individual 
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(Butler,1990:98–102). Butler shows a careful response to the uses 
that we make of subjects who live as anomalies, but adds another 
speculative layer to her reading of Herculine, and to Foucault’s 
reading of her. !e point here is about spectatorial perspective. 
Foucault takes his own position as a reader of structures of power 
and regulation, and he uses Herculine to read his own theoretical 
perspective, "nding in her body a form of unregulated jouissance. 
Foucault uses Herculine to create an emancipatory discourse where 
the regulative category of sex is disrupted by the presence of an in-
tersexed individual. Butler and Foucault both see Herculine as an 
occasion on which to base an analysis of the formal qualities of bi-
nary sexual di%erences. 
Butler, however, protests that Foucault imagines Herculine to feel 
unbounded, liberated joy at her freedom from the regulatory regime 
of sexual di%erence, as if somehow her existence performed and em-
bodied a freedom which would be unimaginable without her. Butler 
claims that Herculine, of course, feels and su%ers from the repres-
sive e%ects of the regulatory regime. !e relationship between the 
troubling or indeterminate individual and the social structures that 
she or he challenge requires much more engagement. !e specular 
distance between the liberatory "gure and the possibilities of free-
dom from regulation is an e%ect of a formal and theatrical context 
and distance.
I shall now speculatively impose the same structure upon the 
discussion of theatre and freaks. Is it possible that disabled actors 
in the twenty-"rst century disability theatre will use their percep-
tions of the changes won by disability rights movements to reclaim 
moments of freedom and joy in the act of performing one’s own 
physical di%erence? !e freak, made theatrical, is no longer a freak, 
but is a theatrical incorporation of their transformative possibili-
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ties. Grosz and Butler are worrying away at the act of spectatorship 
that produces doubt and indeterminacy. Both accept that the way in 
which the body is read emerges from its cultural context.
!e notion that intersexed individuals can produce a crisis of gen-
dered identity is used by many queer theorists, who see the moments 
where repressive systems are #ung into con#ict as exciting and radi-
cal moments of not just liberatory but revolutionary importance. In 
the case of the historical freak show, what Shildrick has called the 
”more or less meticulously contrived spectacle, which encouraged 
viewers to think and see in terms of various binary distinctions bet-
ween ’them’ and ’us’”, Grosz calls ”roughly equivalent to ’queer’ ... a po-
litical gesture of self-determination”. In the disagreement between 
these two feminist scholars of freaks we see a series of interpretative 
possibilities (Shildrick 2002:24; Grosz 1996:56).
!e last freak show o%ers a series of points where the spectator/
spectacle relationship is formalised; indeed, the "ctional relation-
ship between audience and actor and the frame for understanding 
ways of watching within the play are all taken from a shared (but 
unexplored or unarticulated) cultural knowledge of the phenome-
non of the freak show. Freak shows are cited as the occasion and the 
pattern for the encounter between a disabled cast and an audience, 
referring to a shadowy and unwitnessed performance tradition that 
exists in popular culture and scholarship, and also in the vivid sha-
red cultural imagination.
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Artikeln behandlar frågor som uppstår i samband med teateruppsättningar el-
ler referenser till freakshower eller vad författaren kallar enfreakment. Genom 
närläsning av två pjäser, !e last freak show av Mike Kenny och !e mutilated 
av Tennessee Williams, söker författaren undersöka det komplexa förhållandet 
mellan funktionshinder, freakishness, åskådarskap och iscensättning. Vad är det 
som uppstår när speciella åskådarpositioner förutsätts eller påförs en publik, 
antingen omedvetet eller som en medveten provokation? Det politiska perspek-
tivet hos queerteori löper genom artikeln. Den betraktar speci"kt den liberalt 
humanistiska konstruktionen av ”vi” som identitetsposition, och analyserar 
denna som en interpellationshandling i såväl en teoretisk som en teatralisk kon-
text. Särskilt signi"kant är då den funktion som Rosemarie Garland-!omson 
kallar ”det inbjudande vi” (the invitational we): den diskursiva mekanism ge-
nom vilken en kritiker tilltalar oss med ett språkbruk som tvingar oss att dela 
ett kritik- och upplevelseperspektiv. För resonemangets skull måste vi under-
kasta oss denna positionering. Det "nns en sorts interpellation genom vilken 
”vi” erkänner ett perspektiv för att kunna kritisera det. Det förefaller rimligt att 
föreslå att detta perspektiv är ett slags empatiskt socialt rollspel, och att detta 
är själva kärnfrågan i teatervetenskapliga metodologier.
Det är en truism att teatern behöver åskådare för att vara teater. Artikeln 
spekulerar i frågan huruvida tillägnandet av freak show-föreställningens bild-
liga uttryck behöver åskådare för att ge ett spontant gensvar i tid och rum, eller 
om publiken enbart förkroppsligar ”det inbjudande vi”.
På ett plan verkar det självklart att skådespelare med funktionsnedsättning-
ar vill utforska freakshow-föreställningens historia. Att imitera en teaterform 
som varken artist eller åskådare har upplevt har den historiska iscensättelsens 
hela lockelse. ”Någonstans fanns människor som såg ut som du och som publiken 
stirrade på som om de var missfoster. Hur skulle det kännas? För missfostren? 
För åskådaren?” Michael M. Chemers hävdar att ”även om inte alla funktions-
hindrade kroppar som uppträder är freakery, så inleder varje funktionshindrad 
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kropp som uppträder (på scen eller i vardaglig interaktion) någon form av dia-
log med freakshowens upplevda historia” (Chemers 2008:25). Artikelförfatta-
ren medger glatt freakshowens betydelse för funktionshinderskultur, men med 
ett förbehåll: att vi uppmärksamt betraktar publiken, och även ”missfostret” 
på scenen, och att vi samvetsgrant går in i de interpellativa handlingar som 
uppstår när teater görs.
Identitetspolitik kan inte användas för att demontera identiteter. Förutsatt, 
givetvis, att ingen hittar en samling fritt svävande kroppar som betecknar utan 
betecknande, och som kan vara medium för en analys av kategorier och för 
upptäckten att dessa kategorier har misslyckats. Men ”freak” är inte en politisk 
identitet. Freaks kan vara de förvridna skuggor som uppkommer som en e%ekt 
av stirrandet, men de är inte lösningen eller ens förhandlingsbara som en ny 
form av politiskt varande. I stället erbjuder de en möjlighet att störa de funk-
tionshindrande kategorierna, och även att störa själva funktionshindret.
